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INTRODUCTION 
The current foreclosure crisis has devastated many predominantly black 
or Hispanic communities, in part because blacks and Hispanics were dis-
proportionately likely to finance their home purchases or refinance existing 
mortgages with subprime mortgages, which enter foreclosure at far higher 
rates than prime mortgages.  Across the nation, blacks were almost three 
times more likely to receive a subprime first lien home purchase mortgage 
than whites, and Hispanics were 2.6 times more likely than whites to re-
ceive such loans.  There are a variety of explanations for these stark racial 
disparities in subprime lending, ranging from underlying income and 
wealth inequalities between whites, blacks, and Hispanics to intentional 
discrimination in lending practices. 
Efforts to determine which of these explanations are most apt and to 
craft appropriate policy responses to the racial disparities in the share of 
subprime mortgages should take into account the relationship between ex-
isting levels of residential segregation and the racial disparities in the types 
of mortgages homeowners received.  Residential segregation may make 
discrimination more likely by providing easy geographic markers for the 
targeted racial groups, for example.  Residential segregation may also ex-
acerbate the exclusion of blacks and Hispanics from more competitive fi-
nancial markets and from other consumers who are more sophisticated 
about mortgage products.  Understanding the relationship between segrega-
tion and racial disparities in subprime lending may thus help elucidate the 
causes of those disparities.  Similarly, understanding the relationship may 
help policy-makers develop better solutions to the racial disparities in the 
mortgage market.  If levels of segregation are highly correlated with racial 
disparities in lending, policy-makers may need to devote more resources to 
ensuring that minority communities are not targeted by subprime lenders or 
deserted by prime lenders.  If levels of black-white segregation are more 
highly correlated with racial disparities in lending patterns than levels of 
Hispanic-white segregation, policy-makers may need to fine-tune programs 
to take into account differences between highly segregated black and His-
panic communities. 
This Article explores the relationship between residential segregation in 
about 200 metropolitan areas across the country and the propensity of bor-
rowers within those areas to receive subprime loans.  It also examines how 
borrowers of all races who live in highly segregated minority neighbor-
hoods fare in the mortgage market, compared to those who live in more 
heterogeneous communities. 
Part I reports the stark racial disparities in the percentage of subprime 
mortgages received by members of different racial groups.  Part II explores 
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the various mechanisms that might explain those racial disparities, and as-
sesses whether and how a higher level of segregation in a metropolitan area 
might magnify them.  Part III reviews what we know—and do not know—
from earlier studies about the relationships between subprime lending and 
neighborhood segregation.  Part IV describes our study methodology and 
reports our findings. 
I.  RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING 
Prior research on the mortgage market has found persistent racial dis-
parities in the incidence of subprime and high-cost lending.1  Across the 
United States, larger shares of black and Hispanic borrowers originated 
high-cost loans in 2006 relative to white borrowers2 (see panel A of Table 
13).4  That year, 53.3% of first lien home purchase loans issued to black 
borrowers were high-cost, and 46.2% of first lien home purchase loans is-
sued to Hispanic borrowers were high-cost, compared to only 17.7% of 
loans issued to white borrowers.5  The rates of high-cost refinance loans 
 
 1. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN:  INCOME AND 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA (2000), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/unequal_full.pdf; see also Robert B. Avery et al., 
The 2007 HMDA Data, 95 FED. RES. BULL. A107 (2008). 
 2. Our calculations use mortgage loan data reported by lenders under the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) and made available by the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council.  Although 2007 HMDA data is now available, because of the turmoil 
in the real estate markets and mortgage lending industry beginning in 2007, several institu-
tions that originated loans that year did not survive long enough to report their lending activ-
ity.  Therefore for our national analysis, we use HMDA data for loans issued in 2006, which 
we believe represents the most recent complete set of single-year mortgage lending data. 
 3. In Table 1, the percentages presented in the columns represent the percentage of the 
population in that column that has the characteristics described by the row heading. 
 4. Throughout this Article, we use “high-cost” as a measure of subprime lending.  We 
classify first lien loans  as high-cost if they have an interest rate more than three percentage 
points higher than the federal treasury rate of similar maturity.  For junior lien loans (in-
cluded in our refinance loan observations), the threshold is five percentage points.  This 
commonly used definition of subprime lending is more dependable than other measures, 
such as identifying loans made by subprime lenders (using the HUD Subprime Lender list), 
for two main reasons.  First, the high-cost classification identifies subprime loans based on 
loan characteristics instead of lender characteristics.  Second, the latest Subprime Lender list 
was released in 2005, making it a less accurate strategy for identifying subprime lenders in 
2006 and 2007.  See KRISTOPHER GERARDI ET AL., BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, MAKING SENSE OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2008) (discussing the benefits and 
drawbacks to these measures); Avery et al., supra note 1; see also FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL 
ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, DECLINING CREDIT AND GROWING DISPARITIES:  KEY FINDINGS 
FROM HMDA 2007 (2008). 
 5. In this Article, we analyze home purchase loans and refinance loans separately be-
cause their origination patterns are often tied to different macroeconomic contexts and bor-
rower motivations.  For home purchase loans, we look only at first lien loans to avoid the 
inherent double counting of borrowers that results from including junior lien home purchase 
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follow a similar pattern: over half of refinance loans issued to black bor-
rowers in 2006 were high-cost, compared to over a third of refinance loans 
issued to Hispanic borrowers, and only a quarter of those issued to white 
borrowers.6 
Although the rates of high-cost lending in the mid-2000s were lower in 
New York City than for the nation as a whole for all racial groups, in New 
York the racial disparities remained wide (see panel B of Table 1).  Pooling 
New York City loan origination data from 2004–2007,7 we find that less 
than 8% of the first lien home purchase loans issued to white borrowers 
were high-cost, compared to over 40% of the loans issued to black borrow-
ers, and over 30% of the loans issued to Hispanic borrowers.  The shares of 
high-cost refinance loans issued to blacks and Hispanics (37.3% and 
30.1%, respectively) were approximately twice as large as the high-cost 
share issued to whites (17.5%). 
II.  CAUSES OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING AND THE 
ROLE OF SEGREGATION 
There are several possible explanations for the wide disparity in sub-
prime or high-cost lending rates between white borrowers, on the one hand, 
and black and Hispanic borrowers on the other.  These include underlying 
economic inequality between borrowers of different races, cultural or geo-
graphic differences between the various racial groups that lead them to rely 
on different sources for mortgages, and racial discrimination in mortgage 
marketing and underwriting.  This Part describes these explanations in 
more detail, and addresses how the extent of segregation in a metropolitan 
area might affect each of these possible underlying causes. 
A. Underlying Economic Inequality 
The mortgage underwriting process is primarily an evaluation of the risk 
that a mortgage loan applicant will default on a proposed loan and, if there 
is ultimately a foreclosure, that the collateral securing the loan will be in-
 
loans (which by definition are issued to borrowers simultaneously receiving a first lien 
home purchase loan). 
 6. The disparities in high-cost lending between whites and blacks and whites and His-
panics highlighted at the national level persist across the nine census regions, although the 
magnitudes of the disparities differ. 
 7. 2004–2007 are the most recent years for which data are available for New York City 
and also are the years over the last decade in which the highest number of home purchase 
loans were originated in New York City.  The highest share of the home purchase loans 
originated were subprime.  AMY ARMSTRONG ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & 
URBAN POLICY, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS 2007, at 7-9 
(2008). 
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sufficient for the lender to recoup the resulting loss.  While lenders differ in 
how they make these underwriting calculations,8 the industry generally re-
lies primarily on the following measures to make this risk evaluation: the 
applicant’s credit history;9 the ratio of the loan principal to the home value 
(“LTV”) that would result from the proposed loan;10 the ratio of the pro-
posed mortgage payments (as well as required property tax payments, in-
surance payments, and, sometimes, other household debt payments) to the 
applicant’s income (the debt-to-income ratio, “DTI”); the applicant’s liquid 
assets (beyond the down payment); and the type of documentation the ap-
plicant provides to substantiate the applicant’s reported income and asset 
base.11 
A borrower with a lower credit score, higher LTV, higher DTI, lower as-
set base, lower amount of documentation, or a combination of these factors 
represents a greater presumed risk of default or foreclosure.  In theory, 
lenders demand a higher rate of interest or higher origination fees to com-
pensate for the additional risk posed by borrowers with these traits, or insist 
upon mortgage insurance or some other credit enhancement device to miti-
gate the additional risk.  This trade-off is a key element of what is known 
as “risk-based mortgage pricing.”12  Although scholars contest the extent to 
 
 8. Despite the large number of institutions that originate loans, the underwriting of 
much of the mortgage market is largely standardized as a result of the dominance of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac in the secondary markets for prime loans.  Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac make their proprietary automated underwriting systems available to originating lend-
ers. 
 9. While an applicant’s credit history is collapsed for many purposes into a single nu-
meric score by Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO Score), Fannie Mae’s automated underwriting 
system reviews the applicant’s actual credit history for specific characteristics.  See Lew 
Sichelman, Fannie Mae Introduces Desktop Underwriter 5.0, REALTY TIMES, July 19, 2000, 
available at http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20000719_fmunderwriter.htm. 
 10. Since January 15, 2008, Fannie Mae has set lower LTV limits for loans to be issued 
in geographic areas that Fannie Mae considers to be “declining markets,” in effect adding a 
geographic criterion to the underwriting process.  MARIANNE E. SULLIVAN, FANNIE MAE, 
ANNOUNCEMENT 7-22 AMENDS THESE GUIDES: SELLING MAXIMUM FINANCING IN DECLINING 
MARKETS (2007), available at http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2007/ 
0722.pdf. 
 11. For a general description of underwriting criteria, see Anand K. Bhattacharya et al., 
An Overview of Mortgages and the Mortgage Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES 3, 17-20 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 6th ed. 2006) (1995). 
 12. Risk-based pricing also describes the manner in which a lender balances a bor-
rower’s strengths in some underwriting measures against the borrower’s weaknesses in oth-
ers.  Lenders may also seek additional fees or higher interest rates to compensate for non-
credit-based risks, including the risk of borrower prepayment and risks to the lender’s repu-
tation arising from making subprime loans.  See id. at 24-26; see also J. Michael Collins et 
al., Exploring the Welfare Effects of Risk-Based Pricing in the Mortgage Market, in 
BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT:  CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 
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which economically efficient risk-based pricing explains the growth of 
subprime lending over the last several years,13 there is a notable correlation 
between underwriting criteria and the interest rate an applicant receives, or 
whether or not the applicant receives a “subprime” loan (the precise defini-
tion of which varies across the studies).14 
For multiple reasons, risk-based pricing is likely to cause disparate 
shares of whites, blacks, and Hispanics to receive subprime loans, given the 
persistent economic inequality between racial groups in the United States.  
First, income is a major component of DTI; in 2006 (the year the mort-
gages we analyze were originated), the median income for white house-
holds was 62% higher than that of black households, and 35% higher than 
that of Hispanic households.15  Second, household wealth is an indicator 
(albeit an imprecise one) of both liquid assets and a borrower’s ability to 
make a down payment, which is a primary determinant of LTV.  Racial 
disparities in household wealth are even starker than those for income.16  
Finally, blacks and Hispanics are disproportionately more likely than 
whites to have lower credit scores or no credit score at all.17  Underlying 
economic inequality is thus one important reason that racial groups have 
different likelihoods of receiving subprime loans. 
 
138, 138-140 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005) (providing thorough de-
scriptions and discussions of risk-based mortgage pricing). 
 13. Alan White, for example, presents an alternative “opportunity-pricing” hypothesis in 
which subprime mortgage terms are not highly correlated with additional risk, but are in-
stead the result of racial price discrimination and marketing, issues discussed later in this 
section.  See Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing: Present and Future Research, 
15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 503, 504-06 (2004); see also Howard Lax et al., Subprime 
Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 533 (2004). 
 14. See, e.g., Debbie Gruenstein Bocian et al., Race, Ethnicity and Subprime Home 
Loan Pricing, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 110, 117-21 (2008); Marsha J. Courchane, The Pricing of 
Home Mortgage Loans to Minority Borrowers:  How Much of the APR Differential Can We 
Explain?, 29 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 399 (2007); Michael LaCour-Little, The Home Pur-
chase Mortgage Preferences of Low- and Moderate-Income Households, 35 REAL EST. 
ECON. 265, 286-87 (2007). 
 15. The percentages reported are based on the median income for households with non-
Hispanic white householders, black or African-American householders, and Hispanic or La-
tino householders (who could be of any race), as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2006 
American Community Survey. 
 16. In 2004, for example, the median wealth of white families was more than five times 
that of non-white and Hispanic families.  See Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. 
Family Finances:  Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, 92 FED. 
RES. BULL. A1, A8 (2006). 
 17. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT 
SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT 150-55 
(2007); TEX. DEP’T OF INS., REPORT TO THE 79TH LEGISLATURE, USE OF CREDIT 
INFORMATION BY INSURERS IN TEXAS 13-15 (2004). 
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B. Geographic Differences and Borrower Behavior 
In addition to economic inequalities between racial and ethnic groups, 
several other differences between minority and white borrowers might also 
contribute to differential rates of subprime borrowing.  First, mortgage 
channels—the institutional chains through which mortgages are funded—
have a significant impact on the types of loans issued.18  Thus, if racial 
groups use different mortgage channels, they are likely to end up with dif-
ferent rates of high-cost borrowing.  White and minority borrowers have 
tended to access capital markets for home lending through different chan-
nels, with white borrowers more likely than black and Hispanic borrowers 
to take out loans from depository institutions, and black and Hispanic bor-
rowers more likely than white borrowers to rely on largely unregulated 
mortgage banks.19  An analysis of 2006 mortgage data highlighted the ef-
fect that a loan’s source is likely to have on its subprime status by showing 
that controlling for the identity of the lender reduced most of the racial dis-
parities in high-cost lending rates that year.20 
Differences in racial groups’ use of the various mortgage channels are 
no doubt at least partly a result of underlying economic inequality.21  Some 
researchers hypothesize that these differences also might result from the 
relative scarcity of prime lenders in poor minority neighborhoods, which 
forces residents of those areas to rely on unregulated mortgage banks.22  
This hypothesis is supported by somewhat dated empirical evidence sug-
gesting that bank branch locations in minority areas do in fact increase 
lending levels by that bank23 and that minority neighborhoods are relatively 
underserved by bank branches.24  However, all racial groups have come to 
rely less on mortgage lending by banks with proximate physical branches.  
In 2004, only 28.5% of mortgages issued to whites were issued by CRA-
 
 18. WILLIAM APGAR ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., 
MORTGAGE CHANNELS AND FAIR LENDING:  AN ANALYSIS OF HMDA DATA (2007), available 
at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/mm07-2_mortgage_market_channels. 
pdf. 
 19. Id. at 27. 
 20. Robert B. Avery et al., The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES. BULL. A73, A95 
(2007). 
 21. Individual mortgage lenders have historically specialized in prime or subprime 
loans, and in 2006, there was still a significant concentration of high-cost lending among a 
relatively small number of lenders.  Id. at A88. 
 22. See APGAR ET AL., supra note 18, at 30. 
 23. Angela E. Chang, Role of Bank Branch Locations in Minority Lending (Vassar Coll. 
Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 41, 1998). 
 24. See David N. Figlio & Joseph W. Genshlea, Bank Consolidations and Minority 
Neighborhoods, 45 J. URB. ECON. 474 (1999). 
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regulated25 banks that had a branch in the borrower’s metropolitan area,26 
which suggests that unequal proximity to lenders is unlikely to explain 
much of the racial disparities in loan outcomes. 
Consumer advocates also have emphasized the increased role that bro-
kers played in mortgage origination during the subprime lending boom, and 
the possible incentives brokers had to steer borrowers to high-priced prod-
ucts.27  In theory, if using a broker to obtain a mortgage is linked to the 
probability of receiving a high-cost loan, racially disproportionate use of 
brokers (as a result of community relationships and social networks, for ex-
ample) could contribute to racial disparities in high-cost lending.  However, 
while brokers unquestionably played an outsized role in the subprime boom 
(brokers were involved in 71% of subprime loan originations, but only 50% 
of total loan originations in 200528), the empirical evidence that broker us-
age resulted in high-cost loans is mixed.29 
Finally, to the extent that racial groups have different levels of financial 
sophistication, or different access to information about the types of loans 
available, such differences may result in different rates of subprime bor-
rowing.  A number of studies matching borrower survey data to loan out-
comes reveal that subprime borrowers are generally less financially sophis-
ticated than prime borrowers, shop around for loans less than prime 
 
 25. The Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”), which covers most depository institu-
tions, encourages covered lenders to extend loans to traditionally underserved communities 
in metropolitan areas in which the lender maintains physical branches.  See APGAR ET AL., 
supra note 18. 
 26. Id. at 27. 
 27. See, e.g., REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM APGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR:  CREATING GOOD 
MORTGAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS 7 (2007); KELLIE KIM-SUNG & SHARON 
HERMANSON, AARP RESEARCH REPORT, EXPERIENCES OF OLDER REFINANCE MORTGAGE 
LOAN BORROWERS:  BROKER- AND LENDER-ORIGINATED LOANS (2003), available at 
http://www.aarp.org/research/credit-debt/mortgages/experiences_of_older_refinance_ 
mortgage_loan_borro.html 
 28. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, MBA RESEARCH DATA NOTES, RESIDENTIAL 
MORTGAGE ORIGINATION CHANNELS 1 (2006). 
 29. See Amany El Anshasy et al., The Pricing of Subprime Mortgages by Mortgage 
Brokers and Lenders (Credit Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 70, 2006) (concluding that 
subprime borrowers who used brokers obtained cheaper loans than subprime borrowers who 
did not use brokers); Michael LaCour-Little, The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers:  An 
Agency Problem? (Cal. State Univ. at Fullerton, Working Paper, 2008) (finding that broker 
usage for prime loans did lead to higher borrower costs); see also Courchane, supra note 14, 
at 430 (finding that obtaining a loan through the wholesale channel (e.g., broker use) in-
creased the probability of receiving a subprime loan and, in one of two years studied, a 
higher APR); LaCour-Little, supra note 14, at 287 (finding that the only observable impact 
of broker involvement was a correlation between minority borrowers and increased use of 
loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration). 
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borrowers, or have a less accurate estimate of their credit score than prime 
borrowers.30  These findings suggest yet another mechanism that could 
contribute to racial disparities in high-cost lending: differences across racial 
groups in shopping behavior and financial accuity.  Some data support this 
possibility.  In survey results reported by the American Association of Re-
tired Persons (“AARP”), for example, black respondents were significantly 
more likely than white respondents to list reviewing telephone and mail ad-
vertising and considering recommendations from a contractor as steps they 
take to find a home equity lender, and less likely than white respondents to 
list an inquiry at a bank, savings and loan institution, or credit union.31  
Hispanic respondents were more likely to list consulting their mortgage 
broker or current lender than white respondents, but listed an inquiry at a 
bank, savings and loan institution, or credit union as frequently as white re-
spondents.32  Other observers have posited that incorrect estimations by 
some high-credit blacks of their credit-worthiness has skewed the pool of 
black loan applicants towards the less credit-worthy, contributing to ra-
cially prejudiced misconceptions held by lenders about the creditworthiness 
of all blacks.33 
C. Racial Discrimination, Steering, and Targeting 
The final broad category of explanations for racial disparities in sub-
prime borrowing is lender behavior that is motivated, or at least informed, 
by the loan applicant’s race.  The country’s unfortunate legacy of excluding 
blacks, Hispanics, and other racial and ethnic minorities from housing and 
mortgage markets has prompted a rich literature examining lingering racial 
discrimination in these areas.34  Two types of racial discrimination could 
contribute to the racial disparity in subprime outcomes: discriminatory un-
derwriting and discriminatory targeting of potential loan applicants. 
 
 30. See, e.g., Marsha Courchane et al., Consumer Credit Literacy:  What Price Percep-
tion?, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 125 (2008); Marsha Courchane et al., Subprime Borrowers:  
Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 365, 381 (2004); Lax et 
al., supra note 13, at 569. 
 31. AARP, 2003 CONSUMER EXPERIENCE SURVEY:  INSIGHT ON CONSUMER CREDIT 
BEHAVIOR, FRAUD AND FINANCIAL PLANNING fig.20 (2003). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 27, at 23.  But see Vanessa Gail Perry, Is Igno-
rance Bliss?  Consumer Accuracy in Judgments About Credit Ratings, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 
189, 201 (2008) (finding that those who overestimate their credit ratings are more likely to 
be black or Hispanic). 
 34. For a review of this literature, see Gary A. Dymski, Discrimination in the Credit and 
Housing Markets:  Findings and Challenges, (Univ. of Cal., Riverside Dep’t of Econ., 
Working Paper No. 02-18, 2002), available at http://www.economics.ucr.edu/papers/papers 
02/02-18.pdf. 
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Historically it has been difficult to use statistics to prove racial discrimi-
nation in underwriting because of a lack of publicly available data about 
borrowers’ credit-worthiness.  Using privately collected data, however, 
several researchers have attempted to isolate the significance of an appli-
cant’s race in underwriting decisions.  Several studies since 199635 find 
that, even controlling for underwriting criteria (including applicant-level 
credit history), there is a racial gap in the probability of receiving a sub-
prime loan or higher interest rate.36  Most of the research, however, stops 
short of concluding that these results are evidence of actual racial discrimi-
nation. 
An alternative method of investigating racial discrimination in lending 
outcomes is the auditing undertaken by the Federal Reserve, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”).  Such in-depth reviews of actual loan files 
and underwriting processes have revealed some signs of biased behavior on 
the part of lenders.37 
A second form of racial discrimination is targeting, or “reverse redlin-
ing,” in which lenders or mortgage brokers, presuming a lack of financial 
sophistication, aggressively market loans to blacks or Hispanics, or to par-
ticular neighborhoods.38  As a result of this targeting, and the high pressure 
or even deceptive sales tactics lenders or mortgage brokers may employ, 
some minority households who were not otherwise seeking mortgage loans 
will enter the subprime market, and some homeowners or potential home-
buyers with strong underwriting profiles who could have qualified for 
prime loans will instead use subprime products.  To date, little empirical 
research has demonstrated the distinct role of targeting in racial disparities 
of mortgage outcomes, but researchers have observed that geographic pat-
terns of lending are consistent with this mechanism.39 
 
 35. Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston:  Interpreting HMDA Data, 
86 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1996).  For a description of the ensuing debate, see Stephen L. Ross, 
The Continuing Practice and Impact of Discrimination (Univ. of Conn. Dep’t of 
Econ.,Working Paper No. 19, 2005). 
 36. See, e.g., Bocian et al., supra note 14; McKinley Blackburn et al., A Comparison of 
Unexplained Racial Disparities in Bank-Level and Market-Level Models of Mortgage Lend-
ing, 29 J. FIN. SERVICES RESOURCES 125 (2006); Courchane, supra note 14.  But see La-
Cour-Little supra note 14, at 287 (finding that race is not statistically significant in deter-
mining subprime outcomes). 
 37. For a review of audit studies, see Dymski, supra note 34, at 17. 
 38. For a review of legal issues surrounding racial targeting, see Benjamin Howell, Ex-
ploiting Race and Space:  Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 101 (2006). 
 39. As part of an in-depth study of targeting in New Jersey, Newman and Wyly con-
cluded that the geographic lending patterns they find are “what would be expected on the 
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D. The Role of Segregation 
Metropolitan-level segregation could intensify some of the potential 
causes of racial inequalities in subprime lending described above.40  Spe-
cifically, as outlined below, segregation may exacerbate underlying eco-
nomic inequality, contribute to differences in financial sophistication, 
shopping behavior, and mortgage channel use, and provide increased op-
portunities for high-cost lenders and mortgage brokers to target potential 
borrowers. 
Several observers have described the ways in which residential segrega-
tion can reinforce economic inequality between whites and minorities (par-
ticularly blacks).  The spatial mismatch theory, for example, argues that 
segregation separates racial minorities from access to jobs.41  Segregation 
can lead to the social isolation of racial minorities, preventing youth from 
learning from good role models, and limiting the ability of residents to 
benefit from networks that could help them find jobs or otherwise improve 
their lives.42  Segregation can also lead to a concentration of poverty in cer-
tain neighborhoods.43 
Several studies have examined the impact of segregation on economic 
performance and found that segregation exacerbates economic outcomes 
for blacks living in segregated communities.44  Research on segregation 
and the concentration of poverty demonstrates that there may also be a 
multiplier effect when segregation interacts with poverty.  High levels of 
segregation can create pockets of dense poverty within urban areas, magni-
fying the vulnerability of community members to the effects of an eco-
 
basis of the economic rationality of targeting,” but they were unable to establish causation 
with their data and analysis.  See Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, Geographies of Mort-
gage Market Segmentation:  The Case of Essex County, New Jersey, 19 HOUSING STUD. 53, 
78 (2004). 
 40. “Metropolitan-level segregation” refers to the degree of racial or ethnic segregation 
measured at the level of the metropolitan statistical area. 
 41. As introduced by John Kain in 1968, “spatial mismatch” is the idea that segregation 
separates communities from access to jobs because these communities are often spatially 
separate from employment centers.  John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Unemploy-
ment, and Metropolitan Decentralization, 82 Q. J. ECON. 175 (1968). 
 42. Katherine M. O’Regan & John M. Quigley, Teenage Employment and the Spatial 
Isolation of Minority and Poverty Households, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 692 (1996). 
 43. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1998). 
 44. See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or Bad?, 112 Q. 
J. ECON. 827 (1997); O’Regan & Quigley, supra note 42.  Similar to the theories described 
above, Cutler and Glaeser note that there are different pathways by which segregation can 
lead to negative outcomes for minorities, such as limiting contact with educated people and 
increasing commute times. 
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nomic shock.45  Because economic inequality plays a significant role in 
creating racial disparities in high-cost lending, to the extent segregation in-
tensifies underlying inequality, it also could magnify differential rates of 
high-cost loan origination. 
Segregation also influences racial disparities in access to information 
and community networks in many ways.46  By increasing the social isola-
tion of racial minorities, high levels of segregation may limit their exposure 
to financial literacy information, including beneficial loan shopping strate-
gies, and may lead black and Hispanic borrowers to rely on local mortgage 
brokers rather than lower cost but more distant bank branches or internet-
based brokers.  Given patterns of bank branch location, higher levels of ra-
cial segregation might also result in increased racial disparities in geo-
graphic proximity to traditional prime lending institutions.  To the extent 
that differences in proximity to traditional prime banking channels contrib-
ute to disparities in the rate of subprime borrowing, segregation may exac-
erbate those disparities. 
Finally, the geographic concentration of racial minorities resulting from 
higher levels of segregation could make residents of these communities 
more vulnerable to racial targeting by subprime lenders or to systematic, 
racially-motivated avoidance (i.e., “redlining”) by prime lenders.  To the 
extent prime lenders still market by neighborhood geography, high levels 
of high-cost lending resulting from targeting or from past redlining could 
“crowd out” better lending products that might otherwise be marketed there 
by willing prime lenders.47 
III.  PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
SEGREGATION AND SUBPRIME LENDING 
The proliferation of subprime lending over the last decade has led a 
handful of researchers to look at the relationship between subprime lending 
and segregation.  A 2005 report by the National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition (“NCRC”) looked across 177 metropolitan statistical areas 
 
 45. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 43. 
 46. See generally INGRID GOULD ELLEN, IS SEGREGATION BAD FOR YOUR HEALTH?  THE 
CASE OF LOW BIRTH WEIGHT, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS (2000). 
 47. The National Community Reinvestment Coalition Report posits:  “When subprime 
lending crowds out prime lending in traditionally underserved communities, price discrimi-
nation and other predatory and deceptive practices become more likely as residents face 
fewer product choices.”  NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., FAIR LENDING DISPARITIES BY 
RACE, INCOME AND GENDER IN ALL METROPOLITAN AREAS IN AMERICA 3 (2005) [hereinafter 
NCRC REPORT]. 
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(“MSAs”)48 and found, among other things, that in 2003, black borrowers 
in MSAs with higher black-white segregation tended to have higher ratios 
of subprime to prime lending.49  While there was no significant analogous 
interaction between Hispanic-white segregation and lending to Hispanics, 
the study found that Hispanic borrowers in MSAs with higher percentage 
of Hispanic residents tended to enjoy lower ratios of subprime to prime 
loans.50  The study also found that for borrowers living in minority tracts 
(regardless of their individual race), higher MSA-level black-white segre-
gation was associated with higher MSA-level ratios of subprime to prime 
lending.51 
Professors Carolyn Bond and Richard Williams assessed whether in-
creased access to lending for blacks fostered or hindered black-white inte-
gration in a study published in 2007.52  Their analysis examined changes in 
lending and segregation patterns between 1990–2000 across MSAs and 
found that greater lending to blacks increased their homeownership and 
black-white integration in general.53  The authors also found that traditional 
lending increased integration (although the effect was small), but other 
forms of loans (government insured or subprime) did not.54 
Finally, a forthcoming paper looks at the relationship between subprime 
lending and segregation, theorizing that segregation may cause residents to 
be less financially sophisticated and therefore more vulnerable to targeting 
by subprime lenders, and that prime lenders may avoid low income and 
minority neighborhoods in highly segregated areas, leaving residents more 
likely to have to resort to subprime loans.55  Using regression analysis, the 
authors find that MSA-level segregation has a significant impact on the 
 
 48. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget defines a metropolitan statistical area as 
a: 
Core Based Statistical Area associated with at least one urbanized area that has a 
population of at least 50,000. The Metropolitan Statistical Area comprises the cen-
tral county or counties containing the core, plus adjacent outlying counties having 
a high degree of social and economic integration with the central county as meas-
ured through commuting. 
Standards for Defining Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,227, 82,238 (Dec. 27, 2000). 
 49. NCRC REPORT, supra note 47, at 13. 
 50. Id. at 15. 
 51. Id. at 16. 
 52. Carolyn Bond & Richard Williams, Residential Segregation and the Transformation 
of Home Mortgage Lending, 86 SOC. FORCES 671 (2007). 
 53. Id. at 691. 
 54. Id. at 692. 
 55. GREGORY D. SQUIRES ET AL., FED. RESERVE SYS. CMTY. AFFAIRS RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE, SEGREGATION AND THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (forthcoming 2009). 
BEEN_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:44:35 PM 
374 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
proportion of subprime loans issued in an MSA and that “concentration of 
minorities is just as important as the number of minorities in predicting 
subprime loans.”  Indeed, the study finds that “a 1% increase in segregation 
is associated with a .014% increase in the proportion of subprime lend-
ing.”56 
Those studies begin to illuminate the relationship between residential 
segregation and subprime lending, but they focus on the aggregate share of 
subprime lending in a community.  This Article builds on these previous 
studies by focusing instead on individual borrowers, investigating the rela-
tionship between a metropolitan area’s racial segregation and the probabil-
ity that individual members of different racial groups will receive high-cost 
loans.  Higher levels of residential segregation could be associated with a 
greater overall subprime share for the metropolitan area, yet affect the rate 
of subprime mortgages issued to blacks differently than the rate to Hispan-
ics.  Further, it is hard to predict, based upon the explanations discussed 
earlier, how levels of segregation are likely to affect the probability that 
whites receive subprime loans.  This study therefore tries to disentangle the 
effects that segregation may have on subprime lending by assessing the re-
lationship between MSA-level segregation indices and the probability that 
individual borrowers of different races will receive a high-cost loan, con-
trolling for the borrowers’ characteristics.  We divide MSAs into different 
quartiles based on levels of black-white or Hispanic-non-Hispanic white 
segregation, to address the possibility that relationships between segrega-
tion and high-cost lending may be non-linear.  We also assess the relation-
ship between segregation and subprime first lien home purchase loans 
separately from the relationship between segregation and subprime refi-
nancing loans, because the mechanisms by which segregation affects sub-
prime lending may differ according to the type of loan at issue.  Finally, we 
complement our national analysis of MSAs across the country with a more 
focused analysis of lending in neighborhoods within New York City.  That 
analysis assesses whether borrowers of all races who live in neighborhoods 
with high concentrations of either blacks or Hispanics are more likely to 
receive subprime loans than borrowers living in more heterogeneous 
neighborhoods. 
 
 56. Id. at 17. 
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IV.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Methodology 
1. Metropolitan Area Segregation and Lending 
As discussed above, nationwide, black and Hispanic borrowers are more 
likely than non-Hispanic white57 borrowers to receive high-cost loans.  Our 
key question is whether these disparities are larger in more segregated ar-
eas.  We explore whether minority borrowers are more likely to receive a 
high-cost loan if they live in more racially segregated metropolitan areas 
and, using the case of New York City, whether minority borrowers are 
more likely to receive a high-cost loan if they live in neighborhoods with 
larger proportions of minority residents.  In the first part of the analysis, we 
look across metropolitan areas to reveal whether residential segregation by 
race or ethnicity is related to the likelihood of minority borrowers within 
those large metropolitan areas receiving high-cost loans.  Because this 
analysis only observes racial composition and segregation at the MSA-
level, however, it might obscure more intricate relationships between the 
demographics of a neighborhood and the likelihood of its residents of each 
race or ethnicity to obtain a high-cost loan.  Accordingly, the second part of 
the analysis focuses on New York City and looks across neighborhoods to 
determine whether the racial or ethnic composition by neighborhood (i.e., 
census tract) is associated with disparities in lending outcomes for individ-
ual borrowers of different races and ethnicities. 
Our national analysis tests whether the difference in the likelihood that 
minority and white borrowers get high-cost loans is greater in more segre-
gated metropolitan areas.  Specifically, we estimate the following logistic 
regressions: 
 
Log [Pi/(1-Pi)] = X’β + Z’γ + BSEG’µ + BSEG*BLACK’η 
 
Log [Pi/(1-Pi)] = X’β + Z’γ + HSEG’µ + HSEG*HISP’η 
 
Pi is the probability that borrower i receives a high-cost loan, X repre-
sents the matrix of individual-level variables, including a set of income 
variables, race, gender, whether there is a co-applicant on the loan, and the 
 
 57. Throughout this Article, our use of the term “white” refers to non-Hispanic whites. 
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loan amount.58  Z represents the matrix of metropolitan area-level variables, 
including median income, population, proportion minority, and a set of 
dummy variables indicating which of nine census regions contains the met-
ropolitan area.  BSEG and HSEG represent a set of dummy variables repre-
senting the level of black-white segregation and Hispanic-non-Hispanic 
white segregation levels respectively in the metropolitan area (explained 
more fully below).  BLACK and HISP are dummy variables taking on the 
value of one if the borrower is black or Hispanic, respectively.  We are 
most interested in the coefficient µ, which measures the association be-
tween segregation and the likelihood of getting a high-cost loans for white 
borrowers, and the coefficient η, which measures the differential associa-
tion between segregation and high-cost lending for blacks or Hispanics 
relative to whites.  The first regression is estimated for black and white bor-
rowers; the second regression is estimated for Hispanic and white borrow-
ers.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within a metropolitan area. 
There are multiple approaches to measuring racial segregation.  We 
choose to use the most standard measure of segregation, the dissimilarity 
index.  The dissimilarity index captures the extent to which two groups (in 
this case, blacks and whites or Hispanics and whites) are distributed differ-
ently across neighborhoods within a metropolitan area.  Although this in-
dex is imperfect,59 it has been used extensively and can be conveniently in-
terpreted as the share of minority residents that would have to move from 
one neighborhood—here proxied by a census tract—to another within a 
metropolitan area in order for minority and white residents to have the 
identical distributions.  Thus, when there is no segregation, the index is 
zero, and with complete segregation, it equals one.  We also estimated our 
regressions using the isolation index, a measure of exposure that captures 
the extent to which people live in census tracts with other people of their 
same race.  The isolation index for blacks, for instance, is equivalent to the 
percentage of blacks living in the neighborhood of the typical black person 
in an MSA.  The results were largely the same using both indices, therefore 
only the results with the dissimilarity index are shown. 
 
 58. Because they are not available through HMDA or any other public source, our 
analysis does not include individual-level credit scores. 
 59. See David R. James & Karl E. Taeuber, Measures of Segregation, 15 SOC. 
METHODOLOGY 1 (1985); Sean F. Reardon & Glenn Firebaugh, Measures of Multigroup 
Segregation, 32 SOC. METHODOLOGY 33 (2002).  The dissimilarity index is a measure of the 
evenness of the population—how evenly members of a racial group are distributed through-
out the broader population—however, it does not describe the spatial proximity of members 
of a racial group to one another.  Other measures such as the isolation index or the relative 
clustering index provide information about the spatial dimensions of segregation.  The lit-
erature on segregation measures provides criteria for comparing and testing each index. 
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Whatever the measure used, we do not expect segregation to have a sim-
ple linear relationship with lending patterns.  Thus, rather than simply in-
cluding the value of the segregation index, we divide our metropolitan ar-
eas into quartiles of segregation levels and test whether borrowers are more 
likely to get high-cost loans when they live in a metropolitan area with 
low/moderate, moderate/high, or high levels of segregation as compared to 
a borrower living in a metropolitan area with low levels of segregation. 
In addition to estimating separate regressions testing for an association 
between racial segregation and high-cost lending for black and Hispanic 
borrowers, we also undertake separate analyses for borrowers getting first 
lien home purchase loans and those getting refinance loans.  As noted 
above, it is possible that the effects of racial composition and segregation 
differ for first lien home purchase borrowers and those getting refinance 
loans.  We therefore estimate separate regressions for borrowers seeking 
different types of loans. 
In both sets of analyses, we focus on the individual borrower and model 
his or her probability of getting a high-cost loan.  By controlling for the in-
dividual characteristics of borrowers, we can test whether a household is 
more likely to get a high-cost loan than a household with identical, observ-
able attributes if it resides in a more segregated metropolitan area. 
In the national analysis of black segregation, we include all black and 
white borrowers in metropolitan areas in which at least 200 loans were 
made to blacks and at least 200 loans were made to whites in 2006.  In the 
analysis of Hispanic segregation, we include all Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
white borrowers in metropolitan areas in which at least 200 loans were 
made both to Hispanics and to non-Hispanic whites in 2006.  Table 2 
shows key characteristics in 2000 of the 213 and 218 metropolitan areas 
from which our black-white and Hispanic-white sample were drawn, re-
spectively.60  It is worth noting that levels of black-white segregation are 
generally higher than levels of Hispanic-white segregation; the median 
level of black-white segregation in our sample is 0.55, measured by the dis-
similarity index, while the median level of Hispanic-white segregation is 
just 0.41. In other words, within the MSAs in our sample, the median per-
centage of the black population who would have to move to another census 
tract in order to achieve an equal distribution of blacks across census tracts 
 
 60. In Table 2, the information in each column describes the characteristics of the met-
ropolitan statistical areas in the particular quartile of segregation.  For instance, the second 
row of the panel A presents the percentage of the population in all of the MSAs in each 
quartile that is black.  The third row presents an average of the median incomes of the 
MSAs in each quartile.  The column headings present the definitions of the four quartiles of 
segregation in terms of ranges of values of the dissimilarity index. 
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is 55%, while the median percentage of Hispanics who would need to move 
in the Hispanic-white sample is 41%.  Table 2 shows that the characteris-
tics of the metropolitan areas appear to differ with segregation.  The more 
highly segregated metropolitan areas tend to be larger, to have higher in-
comes, and higher shares of minority residents.  Thus, it is important for us 
to control for these characteristics in our regressions to estimate the inde-
pendent association of segregation with lending patterns. 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for our sample of borrowers in the 
black-white and Hispanic-white analyses.61  The sample sizes are quite 
large.62  In the analysis of black-white segregation, we have over 4.3 mil-
lion white borrowers and over 730,000 black borrowers.  These include 
borrowers receiving home purchase as well as refinance loans.  In the 
analysis of Hispanic-white segregation, we have 3.9 million white borrow-
ers and over a million Hispanic borrowers.  Several key differences 
emerge.  Black and Hispanic borrowers tend to have lower incomes and are 
more likely to get high-cost loans as compared to white borrowers.  Spe-
cifically, approximately half of the black and Hispanic borrowers in our 
samples receive high-cost first lien home purchase loans, compared to ap-
proximately 16% of white borrowers.  Black borrowers are also much more 
likely to be single female applicants (41.7%, compared to 22.8% of white 
borrowers), while Hispanic borrowers are more likely to be single male ap-
plicants (42.3%, compared to 29.7% of white borrowers). 
2. Neighborhood Racial Composition and Lending: The Case of New 
York City 
In our analysis of borrowers in New York City, we test whether borrow-
ers are more likely to get high-cost loans in largely minority census tracts, 
and whether this difference across neighborhoods is particularly pro-
 
 61. In Table 3, the percentages in the columns are the percentage of the column popula-
tion that has the characteristic of the according row.  The figures for Median Loan Amount 
and Median Applicant Income are the median dollar amounts of the borrowers included in 
the column population. 
 62. The universe of loans in the raw HMDA data was narrowed for our analysis.  First, 
the original 13,970,183 loans were cleaned to include only home purchase or refinance 
loans for conventional, one- to four-family, owner-occupied properties.  Following this 
process, an MSA code was attached to each loan (by the FIPS county and census tract 
codes), resulting in the removal of observations missing geographic identifiers for either 
county or tract (74,593 observations); observations located in Puerto Rico (59,308 observa-
tions); observations in New England missing tract identifiers (430); and all observations lo-
cated outside of metropolitan areas (1,358,844).  Two sample data sets were then created, 
one including loans to blacks and whites, and one including loans to Hispanics and whites.  
As noted, loans were only included if they were located in a metropolitan area in which at 
least 200 loans were made to black or Hispanic borrowers in 2006. 
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nounced for minority borrowers.  Specifically, we estimate the following 
regressions, similar to those above: 
 
Log [Pi/(1-Pi)] = X’β + Z’γ + SHRBLACKQ’µ + SHRBLACKQ*BLACK’η 
 
Log [Pi/(1-Pi)] = X’β + Z’γ + SHRHISPQ’µ + SHRHISPQ*HISP’η 
 
Pi is the probability that borrower i receives a high-cost loan, X repre-
sents the matrix of individual-level variables, including race, income, gen-
der, whether there is co-applicant on the loan, and the loan amount.  Z 
represents the matrix of census tract, or neighborhood-level, variables, in-
cluding poverty rate, percentage of residents who are foreign born, percent-
age of adult residents with at least some college education, tract population, 
and the share of housing units built prior to 1950.  SHRBLACKQ and 
SHRHISPQ represent groups of dummy variables indicating whether the 
tract is in the second, third, or fourth highest quartile of neighborhoods, 
with respect to the share of blacks and Hispanics, respectively.  The matrix 
of coefficients µ measures the association between neighborhood racial 
composition and likelihood of getting a high-cost loan for white borrowers, 
and the coefficient η measures the differential association for blacks or 
Hispanics relative to whites.  The first regression is estimated for black and 
white borrowers.  The second regression is estimated for Hispanic and 
white borrowers.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within a cen-
sus tract. 
The New York City data set includes only home purchase or refinance 
loans for conventional, one- to four-family, owner-occupied properties in 
New York City during 2004–2007. We restrict loans to those made in cen-
sus tracts with populations greater than 200 and greater than zero housing 
units.  For the black-white sample, we additionally excluded loans in tracts 
that had fewer than ten loans to black borrowers or fewer than ten loans to 
white borrowers.  For the Hispanic-non-Hispanic white sample, we ex-
cluded loans in tracts with fewer than ten loans to Hispanics or to non-
Hispanic whites.  The boundaries used in this analysis are 1999 census 
boundaries.  All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2007 dollars. 
Table 4 shows selected characteristics of the 733 census tracts defining 
our black-white sample and the 1093 tracts defining our Hispanic-non-
Hispanic white sample.  As shown, tracts with larger Hispanic proportions 
tend to have higher poverty rates (25.5% below the poverty line), less edu-
cated residents (35.6% with at least some college education), and a greater 
share of immigrants (43.7% foreign born).  Interestingly, the poverty rate 
does not always increase with the share of blacks in a census tract, in part 
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because tracts with a moderate number of black residents also tend to have 
a larger share of Hispanic residents. 
Table 5 shows individual borrower and loan characteristics for all the 
loans in our New York City samples.  As in our analysis of MSA segrega-
tion, we used HMDA data for our analysis.  Unlike our national analysis, 
however, we pooled loans originated in New York City over a four-year 
period, between 2004–2007, to create a larger sample of loans.  While the 
sample size is of course smaller than for the national analysis, it is still 
quite large, with some 91,000 loans in the black-white sample and over 
137,000 loans in the Hispanic-non-Hispanic white sample.  As for individ-
ual level characteristics, borrowers in New York City in 2004–2007 were 
somewhat less likely to get high-cost loans than borrowers in the country as 
a whole were in 2006 (see Table 3).  This difference may be due to the dis-
parate time periods or to variations between lending patterns in New York 
City and those in the country as a whole. 
B. Results of Regressions 
1. Metropolitan Area Segregation and Lending 
The first column of Table 6 shows the simple, unadjusted association be-
tween segregation at the MSA-level and the likelihood of getting a high-
cost home purchase loan for whites and blacks.  The second column shows 
the association between segregation and the likelihood of getting a high-
cost loan, after controlling for metropolitan area characteristics other than 
segregation.  The third column shows the association, after controlling for 
individual borrower attributes as well as other metropolitan area character-
istics.  The next three columns show these same regressions for refinance 
mortgages. 
None of the coefficients on the segregation variables are statistically sig-
nificant, suggesting that for white borrowers, there is no association be-
tween the segregation level of the metropolitan area in which they live and 
the likelihood that they will receive a high-cost home purchase loan.63  The 
coefficients on the segregation variables that interact with the black race 
dummy variable are, however, almost all statistically significant and posi-
tive, and larger for the variables indicating higher levels of segregation, 
suggesting that black borrowers who live in more segregated metropolitan 
 
 63. The parameter estimates displayed in Tables 6 and 7 represent the logarithmic odds 
of the event (receipt of a high-cost loan) occurring to an individual who has particular char-
acteristics.  Given the complicated nature of interpreting these coefficients directly, pre-
dicted probabilities are presented in Tables 8 and 9. 
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areas are more likely to get high-cost loans.  These relationships hold true 
even when individual borrower characteristics and other metropolitan area 
attributes are taken into account. 
The pattern is generally similar for refinance loans, though the associa-
tions are somewhat weaker and only appear for the most segregated metro-
politan areas.  Specifically, the likelihood of white borrowers getting high-
cost refinance loans is not associated with the level of segregation in their 
metropolitan areas, but black borrowers do appear to be more likely to get 
high-cost refinance loans in highly segregated metropolitan areas. 
We see a generally similar story for Hispanic borrowers.  The results 
from the Hispanic-non-Hispanic white regressions are presented in Table 7.  
Once again, the probability of white borrowers receiving a high-cost loan is 
not associated with the levels of Hispanic-white segregation and are 
slightly less likely to receive a high-cost loan in the most segregated met-
ropolitan areas.  Meanwhile, Hispanic borrowers, like black borrowers, are 
more likely to receive high-cost loans when they live in a metropolitan area 
in which their group is more residentially segregated. 
In summary, it appears that white borrowers are unaffected by levels of 
either black-white or Hispanic-white segregation but that black and His-
panic borrowers in more segregated metropolitan areas are more likely to 
receive high-cost loans than those is less segregated areas.  Significantly, 
the fact that segregation seems to matter for black and Hispanic borrowers 
and not for white borrowers, suggests that our segregation variables are not 
simply picking up some other characteristic of metropolitan area housing 
markets that is associated with high-cost lending. 
Table 8 shows the predicted probability of a typical borrower of a given 
race getting a high-cost home purchase loan in metropolitan areas of differ-
ent segregation levels.  The table shows that segregation has a larger asso-
ciation with high-cost home purchase loans for blacks than for Hispanics.  
In a metropolitan area with low black-white segregation, the predicted 
probability of a black borrower getting a high-cost loan is 2.8 times higher 
than for a white borrower, while in a metropolitan area with high black-
white segregation, the predicted probability of a black borrower getting a 
high-cost loan is 3.5 times higher than for a white borrower.  Similarly, in a 
metropolitan area with low Hispanic-non-Hispanic white segregation, the 
predicted probability of a Hispanic borrower getting a high-cost loan is 2.8 
times higher than for a white borrower, while in a metropolitan area with 
high Hispanic-non-Hispanic white segregation, the predicted probability of 
a Hispanic borrower getting a high-cost loan is 3.4 times higher than for a 
white borrower.  Interestingly, in the case of refinance loans, segregation 
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appears to have a stronger association with the likelihood of getting a high-
cost loan for Hispanic borrowers than for black borrowers. 
2. Neighborhood Racial Composition and Lending: The Case of New 
York City 
Our national analysis gives us strong reason to believe that racial segre-
gation at the MSA level is related to lending outcomes for minority bor-
rowers.  This would suggest that within metropolitan areas, minority bor-
rowers are more likely to receive high-cost loans when they live in 
neighborhoods with larger shares of minority residents, perhaps because of 
differential access to bank branches or information networks or more ex-
plicit racial targeting by high-cost lenders.64  We therefore tested whether 
racial composition of census tracts within New York City is linked to the 
probability that a black or Hispanic borrower living there receives a high-
cost loan, and whether this association is different than for white borrow-
ers.  In the interest of brevity, we do not show the full regression results for 
the New York City analysis.  Instead, we simply show the predicted prob-
ability that a typical white borrower and a typical borrower of a given mi-
nority race or ethnicity will receive a high-cost loan in each quartile of cen-
sus tracts arranged by their percentage of residents of that given race or 
ethnicity.  These are predicted probabilities calculated from regression co-
efficients, holding all characteristics at their mean value for a borrower of 
the given race.  We show results for home purchase loans only, but the re-
sults for refinance loans in our New York City analysis are highly similar. 
The top panel of Table 9 shows that black and white borrowers are more 
likely to get a high-cost loan when they are buying a home in a census tract 
that has a high proportion of blacks.  Blacks and whites, in other words, 
appear to be at a mortgage-cost disadvantage by buying homes in neighbor-
hoods with more black residents.  Specifically, in census tracts in the bot-
tom quartile of black representation, our results suggest that a white bor-
rower with mean characteristics for white borrowers in our sample has a 
5% chance of receiving a high-cost home purchase loan, while a white bor-
rower with identical observable characteristics faces a 17% chance of re-
ceiving a high-cost home purchase loan in the tracts in the top quartile of 
black representation.  For the typical black borrower with mean characteris-
tics of black borrowers in our sample, the likelihood of receiving a high-
 
 64. Note that it is possible that all minority borrowers in a high-segregation metropolitan 
area are disadvantaged by high levels of segregation, regardless of the racial composition of 
their individual neighborhood, because they may have less freedom of residential choice 
than minority households living in less segregated metropolitan areas or that they experience 
more racial hostility. 
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cost home purchase loan is 25% in the census tracts with the lowest shares 
of black residents and 38% in the census tracts with the highest shares of 
blacks.  It is possible, however, that there are systematic, unobserved dif-
ferences between the borrowers living in neighborhoods with more black 
residents.65 
A similar comparison of white and Hispanic borrowers in neighborhoods 
arranged in quartiles by their percentage of Hispanic residents reveals quite 
different results.  As shown in the bottom panel of Table 9, the predicted 
probability that a typical white borrower gets a high-cost loan does not vary 
with the percentage of Hispanic residents in a tract.  A typical Hispanic 
borrower is actually less likely to get a high-cost loan in tracts with higher 
proportions of Hispanic residents.  There is little evidence here that high-
cost lenders are disproportionately operating in heavily Hispanic neighbor-
hoods. 
The results for Hispanics in the Hispanic-white sample of census tracts, 
seemingly at odds with our findings from our MSA-level analysis, do not 
tell the whole story, however.  Unlike most metropolitan areas around the 
country, New York City has relatively large proportions of both black and 
Hispanic residents, and neighborhoods which have low Hispanic popula-
tions often still have large non-white populations (see Table 4).66  Thus, in 
New York City, it may be more relevant to test for the association between 
the likelihood of a borrower getting a high-cost loan and the share of non-
whites in a census tract.  Table 10 presents the results from this analysis.  
The bottom panel of Table 10 shows that as the share of the population that 
is non-white increases, the probability that a Hispanic borrower with aver-
age, observable characteristics for Hispanics receives a high-cost loan also 
increases. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, we find strong evidence that residential segregation plays a 
role in shaping lending patterns.  First, across metropolitan areas in the 
United States, we find that both black and Hispanic borrowers are more 
likely to receive high-cost home purchase and refinance loans in the metro-
politan areas in which their racial group is more segregated.  The likelihood 
that white borrowers will get a high-cost loan, however, is generally the 
same, regardless of the segregation level of the metropolitan area, suggest-
 
 65. This is less of a concern in the metropolitan area analysis because it is far less likely 
that households will sort across metropolitan areas according to segregation levels. 
 66. As shown in Table 4, for instance, the percentage of blacks in low Hispanic tracts 
was 28.4%, while the percentage of blacks in high-Hispanic tracts was 15.7%. 
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ing that the level of segregation in an area is not simply picking up some 
other attribute of a metropolitan area that is associated with high-cost lend-
ing.  Minority borrowers appear to be uniquely disadvantaged by segrega-
tion, and consequently, racial disparities in the percentage of borrowers 
who receive high-cost loans are significantly larger in more segregated 
metropolitan areas.  Racial segregation surely does not explain the full ex-
tent of racial disparities in high-cost lending.  Even in metropolitan areas 
with low levels of segregation, black and Hispanic borrowers are far more 
likely to receive high-cost loans than white borrowers.  But segregation ap-
pears to magnify differences. 
As for whether the racial composition of a neighborhood is directly 
linked to borrower outcomes, we find evidence that it is, at least in New 
York City.  As the percentage of minorities in the neighborhood increases, 
whites, blacks, and Hispanics all have a higher probability of receiving 
high-cost loans.  Interestingly, however, the evidence suggests that the 
relative difference between the probability that a white borrower will re-
ceive a high-cost loan and the probability that a black borrower will receive 
such a loan does not differ markedly between neighborhoods with smaller 
and larger proportions of minority residents. 
While our results suggest that racial segregation may exacerbate racial 
disparities in high-cost lending, our data cannot reveal why these associa-
tions exist.  Our findings for New York City, however, are consistent with 
mechanisms that depend on differences in access to credit markets by 
neighborhood, such as access to bank branches, differences in social net-
works across neighborhoods, and racially discriminatory geographic target-
ing by high-cost lenders, which would impact residents of all races in these 
neighborhoods.  It appears that residents of neighborhoods with higher 
shares of black residents are particularly disadvantaged.  More research is 
needed to understand why exactly minority borrowers are more likely to 
get high-cost loans in more segregated areas and to understand the different 
ways that concentrations of blacks and Hispanics in neighborhoods may af-
fect lending patterns. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Characteristics of HMDA Borrowers 
National (2006) White  Black  Hispanic  
% 1st Lien Home Purchase Loans that Are 
High-cost 17.7% 53.3% 46.2% 
% Refinance Loans that Are High-cost 25.5% 51.7% 38.6% 
Median Loan Amount $143,000 $132,000 $170,000 
Number of Loans 5,726,468 780,654 1,133,720 
    
N.Y. City (2004-2007) White  Black  Hispanic 
% 1st Lien Home Purchase Loans that Are 
High-cost 7.8% 40.8% 30.1% 
% Refinance Loans that Are High-cost 17.5% 37.3% 29.5% 
Median Loan Amount $292,000 $276,000 $288,000 
Number of Loans 127,974 70,308 44,051 
 
Table 2: MSA Characteristics by Quartiles of Segregation, for HMDA Samples (2000) 
Black/White 
Sample 
Q1: Low Seg. 
(0<D<=.45) 
Q2: Low/Mod. 
Seg. 
(.45<D<=.55) 
Q3: Mod./High 
Seg. 
(.55<D<=.64) 
Q4: High Seg. 
(.64<D<=.85) 
Total Popula-
tion 29,452,222 33,622,783 46,450,480 94,264,194 
% Black 8.86% 11.00% 13.64% 16.78% 
Median 
Household In-
come 
40,481 42,843 43,239 44,898 
Number of 
MSAs 54 53 53 53 
     
Hispanic/White 
Sample 
Q1: Low Seg. 
(0<D<=.33) 
Q2: Low/Mod. 
Seg. 
(.33<D<=.41) 
Q3: Mod./High 
Seg. 
(.41<D<=.50) 
Q4: High Seg. 
(.50<D<=.75) 
Population 30,173,948 31,834,895 57,644,166 86,469,988 
% Hispanic 5.79% 11.23% 15.43% 20.26% 
Median 
Household In-
come 
40,664 42,129 42,746 49,146 
Number of 
MSAs 55 54 55 54 
BEEN_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:44:35 PM 
386 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for HMDA Samples (2006) 
 Black/White Sample Hispanic/White Sample 
 
White Bor-
rowers 
Black Bor-
rowers 
White Bor-
rowers 
Hispanic 
Borrowers 
% of 1st Lien Homepurchase 
Loans that Are High-cost 16.5% 53.2% 16.2% 46.8% 
% of Refinance Loans that Are 
High-cost 24.3% 51.4% 23.8% 38.4% 
Median Loan Amount 175,000 159,000 186,000 216,000 
Median Applicant Income 79,000 65,000 82,000 78,000 
% in Income Category 1 19.6% 29.7% 17.8% 18.8% 
% in Income Category 2 42.2% 44.0% 42.1% 43.8% 
% in Income Category 3 18.6% 14.3% 19.3% 19.9% 
% in Income Category 4 14.8% 7.3% 15.9% 10.4% 
% Missing/Unreported Income 4.3% 4.3% 4.5% 6.6% 
% Co-Applicant 47.3% 26.6% 47.3% 30.5% 
% Single Male 29.7% 31.4% 29.7% 42.3% 
% Single Female 22.8% 41.7% 22.9% 27.0% 
% Gender Missing 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 
N 4,325,144 733,451 3,904,704 1,061,725 
BEEN_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:44:35 PM 
2009] HIGH COST OF SEGREGATION 387 
 
Table 4: Neighborhood Characteristics by Quartiles of Minority Concentration, for HMDA 
Samples, New York City (2000) 
Black/White 
Sample 
Low % Black 
(0<%Black 
≤0.19) 
Low/Mod. 
% Black 
(0.19<%Black 
≤0.56) 
Mod./ 
High % Black 
(0.56<%Black 
≤0.84) 
High % Black 
(0.84<%Black) 
% Non-
Hispanic White 46.0% 13.2% 6.9% 1.3% 
% Non-
Hispanic Black 8.7% 36.6% 71.4% 88.9% 
% Hispanic 26.6% 39.2% 15.9% 5.8% 
Poverty Rate 14.0% 25.8% 23.6% 19.6% 
% Foreign 
Born 36.2% 32.6% 33.9% 36.2% 
% with at least 
Some College  53.4% 40.6% 42.1% 43.1% 
% Old Units 
(built before 
1950) 
46.5% 50.3% 45.2% 52.4% 
Number of 
Census Tracts 183 183 183 184 
     
Hispanic/White 
Sample 
Low % His-
panic 
(0<%Hispanic 
≤0.08) 
Low/Mod. % 
Hispanic 
(0.08<%Hispa
nic ≤0.17) 
Mod./High % 
Hispanic 
(0.17<%Hispanic 
≤0.33) 
High % His-
panic 
(0.33< %His-
panic) 
% Non-
Hispanic White 57.2% 47.8% 32.9% 15.0% 
% Non-
Hispanic Black 28.4% 24.9% 23.1% 15.7% 
% Hispanic 5.6% 12.0% 23.7% 54.9% 
Poverty Rate 9.4% 13.5% 17.1% 25.5% 
% Foreign 
Born 25.6% 33.7% 38.9% 43.7% 
% with at least 
Some College 63.1% 54.5% 46.5% 35.6% 
% Old Units 
(built before 
1950) 
42.4% 46.6% 50.0% 55.6% 
Number of 
Census Tracts 273 273 273 274 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for HMDA Samples (New York City) (2004-2007) 
 Black/White Sample Hispanic/White Sample 
 White Bor-rowers 
Black Bor-
rowers 
White 
Borrowers 
Hispanic 
Borrowers 
% 1st Lien Home Purchase 
Loans that Are High-cost 11.1% 35.4% 7.0% 28.2% 
% Refinance Loans that Are 
High-cost 23.9% 33.8% 16.8% 28.8% 
Median Loan Amount 276,000 293,000 292,000 330,000 
Median Applicant Income 95,000 86,000 104,000 97,000 
% in Income Category 1 8.2% 9.6% 6.8% 7.4% 
% in Income Category 2 42.7% 51.2% 37.2% 39.8% 
% in Income Category 3 24.1% 24.4% 24.8% 30.7% 
% in Income Category 4 19.2% 7.3% 25.1% 13.6% 
% Missing/Unreported Income 5.0% 6.6% 5.5% 7.6% 
% with Co-Applicant 33.8% 25.4% 39.3% 27.9% 
% Single Male Applicant 37.2% 31.2% 34.3% 41.5% 
% Single Female Applicant 28.7% 43.1% 26.1% 30.3% 
% with Gender Missing 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
N 37,502 53,711 90,054 46,572 
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Table 6: Regression Results for Black/White Sample for Dissimilarity Index, Modeling Probability of re-
ceiving a High-cost 1st Lien Home Purchase or Refinance Loan (2006) 
 1st Lien Home Purchase Refinance 
 
No controls MSA con-trolsa 
MSA + In-
dividual 
controlsb 
No controls MSA con-trolsa 
MSA + In-
dividual 
controlsb 
Low/Mod. 
Seg. (Q1) 0.032  -0.084  -0.114  0.020  -0.005  -0.021  
Mod./High 
Seg. (Q2) -0.055  0.031  0.025  0.037  -0.048  -0.055  
High Seg. 
(Q3) 0.061  0.038  0.029  0.072  -0.033  -0.036  
Low/Mod. 
Seg. 
Black 
0.153 ** 0.135  0.150 ** 0.063  0.035  0.030  
Mod./High 
Seg. 
Black 
0.080  0.301 *** 0.302 *** -0.098  0.042  0.024  
High Seg. 
Black 0.382 *** 0.468 *** 0.420 *** 0.142  0.212 *** 0.173 ** 
Black 1.242 *** 1.494 *** 1.401 *** 1.119 *** 1.083 *** 1.016 *** 
Other 
MSA 
Variables 
  X  X    X  X  
Other In-
div Vari-
ables 
    X      X  
N 2,154,042 2,154,042 2,154,042 2,904,553 2,904,553 2,904,553 
*** Indicates 99% confidence level, ** indicates 95% confidence.  MSA control variablesa include log of 
the population, share black, and log of median household income, and dummy variables for the 9 census 
regions.  Individual variablesb include applicant income, loan amount, co-applicant status, and gender.  Q2: 
Dissimilarity index between 0.45 and 0.55; Q3: Dissimilarity index between 0.55 and 0.64; Q4: Dissimilar-
ity index > 0.64. 
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Table 7: Regression Results for Hispanic/White Sample for Dissimilarity Index, Modeling Probability of 
Receiving a High-cost 1st Lien Home Purchase or Refinance Loan (2006) 
 1st Lien Home Purchase Refinance 
 
No controls MSA con-trolsa 
MSA + In-
dividual 
controlsb 
No controls MSA con-trolsa 
MSA + In-
dividual 
controlsb 
Low/Mod. 
Seg. (Q2) -0.074  -0.091  -0.084  -0.077  -0.032  -0.029  
Mod./High 
Seg. (Q3) 0.035  0.074  0.074  -0.020  -0.028  -0.027  
High Seg. 
(Q4) -0.167  -0.147  -0.134  -0.248 *** -0.161 ** -0.146 ** 
Low/Mod. 
Seg. 
Hispanic 
0.144  0.135  0.119  0.200 ** 0.147 *** 0.135 *** 
Mod./High 
Seg. 
Hispanic 
0.079  0.060  0.034  0.158 ** 0.208 *** 0.186 *** 
High Seg. 
Hispanic 0.227 *** 0.260 *** 0.226 *** 0.273 *** 0.308 *** 0.274 *** 
Hispanic 1.376 *** 1.311 *** 1.197 *** 0.503 *** 0.548 *** 0.499 *** 
Other 
MSA 
Variables 
  X  X    X  X  
Other In-
div Vari-
ables 
    X      X  
N 2,132,593 2,132,593 2,132,593 2,833,836 2,833,836 2,833,836 
*** Indicates 99% confidence level, ** indicates 95% confidence.  MSA control variablesa include log of 
the population, share black, and log of median household income, and dummy variables for the 9 census 
regions.  Individual variablesb include applicant income, loan amount, co-applicant status, and gender.  Q2: 
Dissimilarity index between 0.33 and 0.41; Q3: Dissimilarity index between 0.41 and 0.5; Q4: Dissimilarity 
index > 0.5. 
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Table 8: Predicted Probability of Getting a High-cost Home Purchase Loan for Typical Bor-
rower of Given Race, by Segregation Level of Metropolitan Area—National Sample.  All 
borrower and metropolitan area characteristics were assumed to be at the mean for a bor-
rower of that race, other than the segregation level of metropolitan area. 
 
 Segregation Level of MSA (quartiles) 
 Q1: Low Seg. 
Q2: 
Low/Mod. 
Seg. 
Q3: Mod/High 
Seg. 
Q4: High 
Seg. 
White 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.16 
Black 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.56 
Black-White Difference 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 
     
White 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.14 
Hispanic 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 
Hispanic-White Differ-
ence 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 
*** Indicates significance at a 99% confidence level 
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Table 9: Predicted Probability of Getting a High-cost Home Purchase Loan for Typical 
Borrower of Given Race, by Minority Concentration in Census Tract—New York City 
Sample.  All borrower and census tract characteristics were assumed to be at the mean for a 
borrower of that race, other than the share of blacks or Hispanics in the census tract. 
 Black and Hispanic Concentration of Neighborhood (quartiles) 
 Q1: Low Black Conc. 
Q2: Low/Mod 
Black Conc. 
Q3: Mod/High 
Black Conc. 
Q4: High Black 
Conc. 
White 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.17 
Black 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.38 
Black-White 
Diff. 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
     
 Q1: Low His-panic Conc. 
Q2: Low/Mod 
Hispanic Conc. 
Q3: Mod/High 
Hispanic Conc. 
Q4: High Hispanic 
Conc. 
White 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Hispanic 0.32 0.23 0.25 0.22 
Hispanic-
White Diff. 0.27*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 
*** Indicates significance at a 99% confidence level 
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Table 10: Predicted Probability of Getting a High-cost Home Purchase Loan for Typical 
Borrower of Given Race, by Non-White Concentration in Census Tract—New York City 
Sample.  All borrower and census tract characteristics assumed to be at the mean for a bor-
rower of that race, other than the share of blacks or Hispanics in the census tract. 
     
Predicted Probabilities 
Q1: Low 
Non-White 
Conc. 
Q2: Low/Mod 
Non-White 
Conc. 
Q3: Mod/High 
Non-White 
Conc. 
Q4: High 
Non-White 
Conc. 
White 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.18 
Black 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.38 
Black-White Differ-
ence 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 
     
White 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.16 
Hispanic 0.14 0.22 0.28 0.31 
Hispanic-White Dif-
ference 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 
*** Indicates significance at a 99% confidence level 
 
 
